Suchergebnisse

This essay analyzes what Alexis de Tocqueville calls an "application of linguistics to history." Beginning with Tocqueville's position that language is the ground of meaningful bonds between people, I argue that the internal logic of a language—the grammar—is correlated with the internal logic governing the social order that both begets and is begotten by that language. Social orders therefore have both linguistic and political grammars and, as the internal logic of language changes, so too can the political grammar. This essay thus traces what Tocqueville envisions as the historical importance of language: from the language of aristocracy and the grammar of difference, to revolutionary language and the grammar of concurrence, to democratic language and the grammar of indifference. It concludes with Tocqueville's suggestion of how good grammar might be taught in democratic ages.

The violence of the attacks on New York and Washington and the subsequent war in Iraq have brought to the fore the issue of citizenship virtue. This paper challenges nearly a generation of citizenship theorists who, by privileging discourse over other virtues, have impaired the capacity for a balanced political response to this event. It is argued that the removal of the virtue of courage from the model of good citizenship has resulted in a politics that either cannot suffer violence when it is needed, or one that knows no boundaries to violence when it is employed. From an interpretation of Plato's Laches, a model of citizenship—which is here called the Hunter-Philosopher — is explored that situates courageous citizenship between the unmitigated and unrestrained violence of the warrior on the one hand, and the irresolute, divisive speech of the sophist on the other.

"This book corrects an imbalance in Canadian political literature through offering a conservative account of Canadian political thought. Across 15 chronologically organized chapters, and with a mixture of established and rising scholars, the book offers an investigation of the defining features and characteristics of Canadian conservative political thought, asking what have Canadian conservative political thinkers and practitioners learned from other traditions and, in turn, what have they contribute to our understanding of conservative political thought today? Rather than its culmination, Canadian Conservative Political Thought will be the beginning of conservative political thought's recovery and will spark debates and future research. The book will be a great resource for courses on Canadian politics, history, political philosophy and conservatism, Canadian Studies, and political theory"--

AbstractThis article inquires into the moral successes and failings of the superrich in America. To do this, we turn to Alexis de Tocqueville who outlines a set of expectations for any privileged elite. Drawing from his Old Regime, Memoir on Pauperism, and Democracy in America, we argue that the superrich are obliged to a particular kind of charity, which we specify as philanthropy. To fulfill their philanthropic duties, the superrich must steadfastly attend to three obligations: maintaining their local communities, safeguarding local liberties, and providing moral leadership. In the conclusion, we suggest how the superrich might be disciplined unto this virtue.

AbstractToleration is lauded as a chief virtue of contemporary liberalism. Without this virtue, it seems, citizens are ill‐equipped to reconcile ethical disagreements appropriately in pluralistic societies. In recent scholarship and practice, however, toleration has undergone significant transformation. The tolerant citizen, we are told, avoids causing the discomfort or pain associated with uncomfortable conversations, criticism, or even difference of opinion. Regrettably, this understanding of toleration hinders rather than facilitates dialogue and conflates pain or discomfort with cruelty. To offer a more viable theoretical grounding for toleration, this article turns to the third unnamed virtue of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. When conceptualized as an Aristotelian moral virtue with vices of both deficiency and excess, it is clear how toleration, taken too far, becomes a vice. Moreover, Aristotle's principles of contextual sensitivity, other‐regarding virtue, and non‐cruel pain constitute a better foundation for restoring toleration as a healthy virtue for liberal citizens.